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ABSTRACT. This paper investigates which business starters
experience credit rationing by simultaneously analyzing which
business founders apply for credit and which are refused. We
argue that credit denial depends largely on the entrepreneurs
commitment and signals regarding the repayment of the loan
and the success chances of the proposed business. Our empirical
analysis is based on a sample of 1140 potential business starters
in the Dutch county South Limburg. Our ﬁndings show that
commitments drive the credit application and approval, while
the eﬀects of signals are mixed. The ﬁndings also suggest that
business founders have a pretty good idea regarding whether
their applications will be honored or not.
KEY WORDS: Self-employment, capital market imper-
fections, credit rationing.
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1. Small businesses and access to bank funds
Entrepreneurial activity is hampered by limited
accesstoﬁnancialresources.Theempiricalevidence
of capital market imperfections in the context of
starting businesses is widespread. For instance,
Evans and Jovanovic (1989) and Johansson (2000)
report that personal wealth facilitates an individ-
ualspossibilitytobecomeself-employed.Likewise,
the receipt of an inheritance or other windfall gains
raises the probability of entering self-employment
(Holtz-Eakin et al. 1994a, b; Lindh and Ohlsson,
1996; Blanchﬂower and Oswald, 1998).
One reason for the lack of ﬁnancial resources
available to starting businesses is that banks
hesitatetolendfundstobusinessesingeneraland
small enterprises in particular.
1 Ang (1991, 1992)
discusses capital market imperfections in the
context of small establishments and observes
that in judging credit applications banks face
several serious information problems. First, as
usual the applicants information concerning the
projects prospects is usually better than that of
outsiders. Information asymmetries may be
substantial in the context of small businesses
because of the relatively high ﬁxed cost of
gathering information banks incur for small
transactions. Furthermore the smaller number
of repeated transactions; the smaller incentives
of outside analysts to collect information; and
the fewer instruments available to small busi-
nesses to signal their credibility yield conditions
under which serious information asymmetries
prevail. Second, the quality of the data provided
by small business owners for review by stake-
holders like banks is often poor due to a lack of
management experience or staﬀ capable to
produce useful information. Ang (1991, 1992)
notes that an advantage of small businesses is
that the managers are often the owners as well.
This feature may resolve the manager versus
ownership problem. However, he also argues
that conﬂicts of interest between the owner and
other stakeholders, like suppliers exercising
monopoly power, may be more serious.
Since banks ﬁnd it hard to determine whether
a project is a good or bad risk, a supply shortage
of loans may result in equilibrium. Then some
business starters will not be able to receive a
loan even though their project yields a positive
net expected value, because banks ask for a
high-risk premium and ration credit (Stiglitz and
Weiss, 1981). Therefore, any business owner
seeking bank ﬁnancing needs to overcome the
hesitation and doubts of banks. An extensive
theoretical literature exists that considers which
instruments may be used by banks to distinguish
between bad and good loans and to mitigate the
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DOI 10.1007/s11187-006-9030-1risk of moral hazard (i.e. when the borrower
does not put enough eﬀort in to the business).
Such instruments include collateral the bank can
seize if the borrower defaults and requests to
hold the borrower liable for repayment by e.g.
personal guarantees. Alternatively, the bank can
assess the loan quality by looking for signals
regarding the future prospects for the business.
However, very little empirical knowledge
exists about the characteristics of individuals
who would like to start a business, but are
restricted in doing so because of credit rationing
by banks.
2 Although a number of empirical
studies on credit denials and applications have
beenpublished,theoverallpictureremainsvague
and ambiguous as studies diﬀer in their research
objectives, the used explanatory variables and as
already mentioned the addressed population and
statisticalmethodsemployed.Acoupleofstudies
have a particular interest in whether credit
application and denial diﬀers by gender or race
implying a possible presence of discrimination by
banks (see, e.g. Cavaluzzo and Cavaluzzo, 1998;
Blanchﬂower et al., 1998; Raturi and Swamy,
1999; Levenson and Willard, 2000; Storey, 2004).
Even after the credit worthiness of the respon-
dent is controlled for, these studies show that
blacks are signiﬁcantly less likely to receive
credit, while there are no diﬀerences for other
ethnicities or women. All studies on credit denial
include the risk of the loan, but use rather
diﬀerent indicators. Many studies build upon
human capital theory and look at education, age,
work experience and social background to
determine whether a lender carries risks or not
(see, e.g., Cavaluzzo and Cavaluzzo, 1998;
Honig, 1998; Raturi and Swamy, 1999; Biggs
et al., 2002; Storey, 2004). Across these studies,
indicators related to human capital and demo-
graphics are not signiﬁcant in the denial decision.
Several studies assess the loan risk by taking
characteristics of the ﬁrm, such as size, age and
legalstatus,orﬁnancialindicators,suchasproﬁt,
current loans or capital assets (Cavaluzzo and
Cavaluzzo, 1998; Blanchﬂower et al., 1998; Biggs
et al., 2002; Storey, 2004). Across studies, the
eﬀects of those indicators on the denial decision
are either mixed or non signiﬁcant. Summarizing
itcanbestatedthataconsistentoverallpictureof
the determinants of credit approval and denial is
still missing. Therefore, we propose in this paper
toinspectthe issuefrom aslightly diﬀerentangle.
Rather than looking at risk of a loan, we look at
whether business founders or owners can reduce
credit denial through giving commitments or
sending reliable signals.
The ﬁrst objective of this paper is to provide
some insight into the conditions under which
banks are willingto approve loan requests. In fact,
we analyze data collected among 1140 individuals
living in South Limburg (The Netherlands) who
considered becoming self-employed in 1998 and
1999. Of them 342 applied for a bank loan to start
their business. It should be noted that the sample
used forms an interesting contribution to the cur-
rent literature in two aspects. First, this study
provides an analysis of a European country, while
previous studies investigated either the US (e.g.,
Cavaluzzo and Cavaluzzo, 1998; Levenson and
Willard, 2000) or developing countries (e.g.,
Honig,1998;RaturiandSwamy,1999;Biggsetal.,
2002; Storey, 2004). Second,the sample consists of
potential new business founders, a group which is
particularlylikelytoface ﬁnancing diﬃculties.The
survey provides information about whether these
individuals made an application at a bank and it
indicates to which extent these applications have
been granted. Moreover, the data are very rich in
additional information providing us with multiple
indicators for commitments and signals a business
founder might give to enhance the approval
chancesofthecreditapplication.Thus,weareable
toinvestigatewhetherbusinessfoundersproviding
commitments and sending signals are more likely
to receive credit.
The second objective of the paper is to inves-
tigate whether business starters have some
understanding of the rating criteria employed by
banks to determine whether to grant a loan or
not. If the probability to obtain a loan is small
there is little incentive to apply. Individuals who
do not apply because they fear their request will
be denied are also aﬀected by credit rationing. As
understanding the true extent of credit rationing
needs to account for discouraged application
behavior (Levenson and Willard, 2000; Kon and
Storey, 2003), we intend to bridge the gap in the
current literature (Parker, 2004) by analyzing
denial and application rates simultaneously with
a bi-variate probit model rather than estimating
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Cavaluzzo and Cavaluzzo, 1998; Raturi and
Swamy, 1999; Storey, 2004) or in sequential steps
(Levenson and Willard, 2000). This approach
allows us to determine which factors induce both
direct credit rationing by the banks and indirect
credit rationing because of discouraged applica-
tion behavior. Moreover it enables us to inves-
tigate whether business starters have some
understanding of the credit rationing policy of
the bank. Such understanding exists if a variable
observable to the bank implies a higher (lower)
probability of denial and a lower (higher) prob-
ability of application simultaneously.
The paper proceeds as follows. In section 2
we develop a bivariate model accounting for
sample selection by which we can identify the
characteristics of individuals who are more
likely to experience credit rationing. This model
determines the probability that an individual is
denied a request for a loan and incorporates the
decision to apply for a loan or not. In section 3
we provide an overview of the empirical and
theoretical literature that is relevant to our
subject. Section 4 describes the data we analyze.
The estimation results are depicted in section 5
and section 6 concludes.
2. The identiﬁcation of credit rationing
To conduct an analysis of the banks rationing
behavior, we assume that the decision to approve
or deny a credit request depends on a set of
lenders characteristics observed by the bank.
These features are represented by the vector X.
We assume that the bank observes X and on the
basis of the observed characteristics determines
the projects risk and quality (cf. Guiso, 1998).
Suppose that Z
* is a latent variable for the banks
decision whether to grant the loan or not. When
Z
*>0 the signals observed induce the bank to
classify the project as a ‘lemon and to ration the
credit extended to it accordingly. We deﬁne Z
* as
follows:
Z  ¼ Xb þ l ð1Þ
where b is a vector of coeﬃcients and l is an
error term. Let Z be a dummy variable, which
obtains the value 1 if the ﬁrm is denied credit by
the bank and zero otherwise.
The ﬁrst part of the empirical model explains
the probability that a bank approves a credit
application and focuses on the supply side of the
market for new business ﬁnancing. However,
business starters – even those with very prom-
ising business ideas – may not apply for credit
because they expect their eﬀorts to be unsuc-
cessful anyway. Especially if the cost for a credit
application is substantial and the probability of
being rejected is high, it may be optimal not to
apply (Levenson and Willard, 2000). Therefore,
an analysis of the credit denial is likely to be
biased towards ﬁnding too small incidence of
being denied if one does not account for the
decision to apply for credit as we described
previously. We solve this problem by estimating
a model that takes into account the application
process and the outcome of the application
simultaneously as follows. We observe the
banks decision conditional upon the event that
an individual has applied for a loan. The deci-
sion to apply depends on a number of charac-
teristics of the potential applicant, which are
represented by a vector W and are observable to
the econometrician. Let Y
* be a latent variable
for the decision whether to apply for a loan or
not. When Y
*>0, the information is such that
an application is expected to yield a positive
evaluation by the bank. We deﬁne:
Y  ¼ Wc þ e ð2Þ
where c is a vector of coeﬃcients and   is a
random error. Let Y be dummy variable, which
takes the value 1 if the potential business starter
applies for a loan and zero otherwise.
We observe Z and X only if an application has
occurred, i.e. if Y = 1. Furthermore, while   is
deﬁned over the whole population of individuals
who considered to become self-employed, l is
only deﬁned on the subpopulation for which
Y = 1.Tomodelthis,weassumethat andlare
drawn from a bivariate normal distribution,
correctedforasampleselectionwithacorrelation
coeﬃcient of q:  ,l N(0,0,1,1, q). This indicates
that the means of the error components are equal
to zero and that the standard deviations equal
189 Business Starters and Credit Rationingone.LetF2denoteabivariatenormalcumulative
distribution function (cdf) and F a univariate
normal cdf. We have three categories of obser-
vations.
3
Y ¼ 1; Z ¼ 1w i t h
PrðY ¼ 1; Z ¼ 1Þ¼U2ðWc;Xb;qÞ
Y ¼ 1; Z ¼ 0w i t h
PrðY ¼ 1; Z ¼ 0Þ¼U2ðWc; Xb; qÞ
Y ¼ 0 with PrðY ¼ 0Þ¼Uð WcÞ
ð3Þ














We ﬁnd estimates for c, b and q by maximizing
(4) with respect to these parameters.
3. A closer inspection of credit denial
and application
3.1. Commitments and signals
The pecking order theory as proposed by Myers
and Majluf (1984) suggests ﬁrms preference for
various ﬁnancing forms. This pecking order
theory may be applied to small companies as
well.
4 Most small companies are managed by
only one manager who owns all the shares.
These manager/owners tend to have a preference
for ﬁnancing forms that ensure their control
over the business. Therefore, ﬁnancing is usually
based on ‘‘ﬁrstly personal savings and resources
generated internally; secondly, short and long
term debt; and thirdly, least preferred of all, new
share issues that dilute control’’ (Lopez-Gracia
and Aybar-Arias, 2000, p. 56). The vast majority
of small ﬁrms and business start-ups relies on
commercial banks for obtaining additional
ﬁnancial funds (see, e.g., Keasey and Watson,
1993; Parker, 2004). Equity ﬁnancing is hardly a
viable alternative, because the equity market for
small ﬁrms is not well developed, most entre-
preneurs lack the experience and expertise to
obtain equity ﬁnancing and raising equity is
rather costly and therefore ineﬃcient for smaller
ﬁnancing volumes.
Although bank loans are the most widely
used form of small and new business ﬁnancing,
the exchange relation between banks and their
small business clients often suﬀers from market
imperfections, such as agency costs, information
asymmetry and moral hazard. Banks are unable
to assess the credit risks of a venture well and
the business starters assessment of their ven-
tures suﬀers from an ‘optimistic bias. Especially
in markets where it is diﬃcult to distinguish
between good and bad credit risks, these capital
market imperfections result in a supply shortage
of ﬁnancial funds. Some new ventures with
positive net present value cannot attract the
necessary ﬁnancial funding, because banks ask
for high-risk premiums and ration credit
(Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981). Banks are more likely
to approve a credit request at reasonable terms,
if the bank is convinced that the business is
likely to succeed or if the bank is able to collect
the debt, even if the proposed venture fails.
Credible commitments and signals on part of the
business starter are mechanisms enhancing the
chance to collect the debt and the banks ability
to assess the success chance of the venture.
Thus, business starters can increase their possi-
bilities to obtain the required ﬁnancial funds by
giving such credible commitments and signals
(Avery et al., 1998).
Table I shows how credible commitments and
signals mitigate the banks fear to invest in a
venture with negative net present value and to
loose the provided debt. In terms of our model
introduced in section 2, each cell of Table IV
refers to a broad category of explanatory vari-
ables collected in the matrix X. In the following,
we will work out the cell entries of the ﬁgure
starting at the top of the left column and then
moving down. Next we turn to the right column
starting at the top and moving down again.
Credible commitments guaranteeing the
repayment of the debt even if the business fails
are linked to collaterals underlying the loan.
Such collaterals, i.e. the business starters private
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reduce the banks exposure to loosing the debt
(Keasey and Watson, 2000; Parker, 2004). Evi-
dence in favor of this conjecture is provided by
related studies, which show that the chance
to obtain credit is signiﬁcantly increased by
collateral commitments, suchas home ownership
(Black et al., 1996; Raturi and Swamy, 1999).
The reluctance of banks to provide credit for
business start-ups is also inﬂuenced by the diﬃ-
culties to assess a new business. From the banks
perspective information provided by the entre-
preneur is less reliable, because entrepreneurs
have self-interest in exaggerating the success
chances of their businesses. They can diminish
this reluctance with commitments increasing the
credibility of their credit application (Ang, 1991)
andbyprovidingmoredetailedandmorereliable
information, e.g., by writing a business plan.
Especially if the ﬁnancial plan of the venture is
designedwiththesupportofanaccountantandif
anaccountant approves ofit, banksmaybe more
willing to grant a loan. The provision of such
betterinformationiscostlyforentrepreneursand
thus they have to commit their own resources
before a decision on the credit application has
been taken. The fact that entrepreneurs incur
costs to obtain better and more reliable infor-
mation about the credit applications worthiness
should give the bank more faith in the success
potential of their business ideas. The extent to
which a business founder commits own resources
totheventurealsoinformsthebanksthattheyare
investing in a serious business idea. Own invest-
ments are a credible commitment mitigating the
principalagentconﬂictbetweenstockholdersand
bondholders, because the more own money
business starters invest, the less likely it is that
they take on very risky investments.
5
The earning capacity of a business starter in a
subsequent job, i.e. the job after the eventual
failure of the business, is a signal to the bank,
whether the business starter can meet his credit
obligations even if the business fails (see last
column of Table I). The income that a business
starter earned previously is an indicator, which
signals the earning capacity after an eventual
failure. Furthermore, young and highly edu-
cated business starters are more likely to have a
high post-failure earning capacity than older
and less educated people.
Although banks care about debt-repayment,
their primary objective is to allocate their funds
to successful ventures, because they proﬁt
much more from a long-term relation with a
new business that grows to an established ﬁrm
(Storey, 1993). Banks are seeking promising new
business proposals, whose risks they can evalu-
ate well. Thus, business starters need to convince
banks that their proposals are promising and
can be assessed well. The broad literature on
successful business start-ups oﬀers an insight on,
which factors can serve as a reliable signal for
new business success. Several studies show that
the founders career aﬀects the success of the new
business (Bru ¨ derl et al., 1992; Gimeno et al.,
1997; van Praag, 1996). Further, demographic
characteristics and the social background of the
business starter are related to success. Most
studies report no signiﬁcant eﬀects of variables
related to education or work experience on
denial rates (see, e.g., Cavaluzzo and Cavaluzzo,
1998; Blanchﬂower et al., 1998; Raturi and
Swamy, 1999); only Storey (2004) ﬁnds that a
higher education reduces denial and increases
application. Married persons are more likely to
become successful entrepreneurs, because their
spouses oﬀer them additional ﬁnancial and
emotional support. Further, spouses often work
as a relatively cheap and very reliable ‘employee
in the new business or they hold a paid job,
which eases the liquidity of the entrepreneurs
household and allows re-investing more earnings
TABLE I
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married couples are less likely to be ﬁnancially
constrained consumers and Honig (1998) reports
that married business owners in Jamaica are
more likely to receive a loan. Children require
care, money, eﬀort and time, which cannot be
invested in the newly founded business. As a
consequence, individuals who are responsible for
children had and have little opportunities to
spare resources for their business and are less
likely to succeed. A number of studies have
shown that access to bank ﬁnancing is more
diﬃcult for blacks (Bates, 1991; Munnell et al.,
1996; Blanchﬂower et al., 1998; Cavalluzzo and
Cavalluzzo, 1998; Raturi and Swamy, 1999;
Storey, 2004), suggesting discrimination on
ethnic background as a possible explanation.
We also explore whether multiple ownership
facilitates access to bank loans. On the one
hand, banks may be reluctant to provide ﬁnan-
cial support due to complex agency problems if
more parties are involved in the ﬁnancing of a
business (Ang, 1991). On the other hand
businesses founded by more than one entrepre-
neur pool more human capital (Cressy, 1996).
Furthermore, many individuals liable for the
underlying loan reduce the banks risk in case of
bankruptcy (Parker, 2004). These observations
indicate that it is diﬃcult to predict a priori
whether banks appreciate the presence of other
parties, who already committed their resources
to a new business venture. Hence, the empirical
analysis has to resolve this issue.
Above, we framed the diﬀerent variables as
indicators for commitments and signals, empha-
sizing a credit supply perspective to explain
applications for loans. Some of the indicators
could,however,alsodescribedemandfactors.
6In
particular the amount of own equity, previous
income and education can indicate such diﬀer-
ences in demand for bank loans. From a demand
perspective, the expected eﬀects of these charac-
teristics on credit application would be reversed.
Thus business starters with larger amounts of
own equity, a higher previous income and a
higher level of education are less likely to apply
for credit as they have lower need for external
ﬁnancialmeans.Thesestarters,whocouldobtain
credit but do not need it are the opposite of the
discouraged borrower.
In general, we expect that the credit applica-
tions approval chance increases with the amount
as well as the credibility of the commitments and
signals an entrepreneur places to convince the
bank that sheor he is a reliable personpursuing a
business idea with good success chances. Here, it
should be noted that ﬁnancing of new businesses
solely can be based on the assessment of the
potential business founder as a person and the
blueprint of an idea, since past ﬁnancial records
do not exist. Thus, characteristics of the entre-
preneur will play an even more crucial role.
3.2. Interplay between denial and application rates
To understand whether individuals do not apply
because they expect their request to be denied we
simultaneously analyze the loan application
decision. If potential business starters are dis-
couraged to apply for a loan even though their
business idea is excellent, they should be
considered subject to credit rationing as well
(Kon and Storey, 2003). We estimate the appli-
cation equation also including the explanatory
variables we use for the denial decision. Indi-
viduals base their decision to apply on the
applications success chance, the utility derived
from receiving a loan and the application cost. In
the previous section, we argued for instance that
the availability of collateral and the perceived
ﬁrms success chances reduce the chance that a
bank denies a loan request. Thus, business
starters that can provide the required collateral
are more likely to ask for a bank credit, because
their higher chance of credit approval justiﬁes
incurring the costs associated with a credit
application. Therefore, variables that explain a
banks decision to grant a loan are likely to aﬀect
the decision whether to apply or not. However, it
may be argued that the decision to apply for a
loan and the decision to write a business plan or
to consult an accountant coincide to a large
extent. This may cause some endogeneity prob-
lems. To circumvent this issue we disregard these
commitments in the ﬁrst stage decision to apply.
Furthermore excluding these two variables from
the application decision improves the identiﬁca-
tion ofthe model. Obtainingparameter estimates
for our model where the variables represented by
W and X in equations (1) and (2) are identical is
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searching for the maximum likelihood does not
converge in this instance. To further improve
identiﬁcation of the parameter estimates we add
a variable to the equation explaining the loan
application. It counts the number of the business
starters contacts with others, who are self-
employed as well. It is reasonable to assume that
such contacts improve an individuals ability to
approach and convince banks. In fact these
contacts may inform the applicant about the
procedures employed by the bank and which
bank to approach. However, bank employees are
unlikely to be knowledgeable about the identity
and size of an applicants contacts. Therefore we
exclude it from the equation explaining the
banks decision.
4. Research design: used data and information
The estimation of the model is based on a survey
conducted among individuals living in the
Southern part of Limburg, a Dutch province.
A clear advantage of our data is that all indi-
viduals who intended becoming an entrepreneur
in the years 1998 and 1999 were invited to par-
ticipate in the research. The ﬁnal dataset is based
on computer assisted personal interviews (CAPI)
with 1223 respondents, which is a response rate
of 29%. There is no strong evidence of non-
response bias, though it is found that business
starters were a little more likely to participate
than non-starters. Of the respondents 994 started
a business while 229 refrained from their original
idea to become an entrepreneur (see Blumberg
and Pfann, 2003 for further information on the
survey). Due to partial item non-response we
work with a total sample of 1140 respondents to
analyze the application rate. Our sample consists
of a wide range of businessfounders and includes
many very small businesses (35% of the founders
started a business without employees and
another 50% just with one or two employees).
Since the data were collected only in a sub
province, South-Limburg, of the Netherlands
one may question whether they are representa-
tive for the country as a whole. We have com-
pared the distribution of business start-ups
across sectors in the Netherlands and in the
sample and show the results in Table II.
The table indicates that some notable diﬀer-
ences exist between the sectoral distribution of
the start-up ﬁrms in our sample and those for
the Netherlands. The regional (South Limburg)
and country level data have similar characteris-
tics in terms of traditional sectors (i.e. manu-
facturing, construction and wholesale).
However, the South of Limburg seems to be an
attractive area to found a ﬁrm in business ser-
vices and retailing.
7
Our ﬁrst dependent variable is apply which is
equal to one if the respondent has made a loan
application and is zero otherwise. Our sample
for the analysis of the denial rates is based on a
sub-sample of those 342 respondents (i.e. 31%
of the total sample), who applied for credit at a
bank. We employ two dependent variables to
measure credit rationing by two diﬀerent types
of loan denial. The ﬁrst, fully_denied, is equal to
one if the application is fully denied, and zero
otherwise. According to this measure a denial
occurs if the applicant cannot borrow any
money at all from the bank. About 18% of the
applications were completely rejected. The sec-
ond variable, partly_denied, is one if the appli-
cation is fully or partly denied, and zero
otherwise. Hence, according to this variable a
denial occurs if the applicant receives less then
applied for. Approximately 29% of the appli-
cations were denied full approval. During the
interviews, all respondents provided extensive
information on their educational and occupa-
tional career, their social background, their
TABLE II
Business start-ups in the Netherlands and South Limburg







Business services 13.1 25.4
Other 48.4 25.4
Numbers are percentages. Data are obtained from Dutch
Statistics for the year 2000 (Statline). The data for South
Limburg are based on the sample employed in this paper
(see also Blumberg and Pfann, 2003).
193 Business Starters and Credit Rationingspouse, available ﬁnancial capital, the founding
process and the started business.
In our theoretical part, we linked the appli-
cation- and denial rates to the entrepreneurs
possibilities to give credible commitments and
signals. Our data do not provide direct
measurements of such commitments and signals.
Rather, we use variables, which can serve as
valid indicators for our theoretical constructs.
Table III shows which indicators are used to
measure the diﬀerent commitments and signals.
The available collateral is measured with the
dummy variable home ownership, which equals
one, if the respondent possesses a house and zero
otherwise. Commitments helping a bank to im-
prove its own assessment of a business proposal
are measured with the variables business plan and
accountant. A business plan provides the bank
with additional information on the proposed
venture and thereby enlarges the banksi n f o r -
mationbasis.Businessandﬁnancialplans thatare
designed with the aid of an accountant, who has
to comply with certain legal and professional
standards, areless biasedandconsequently enrich
the information basis of a bank. Another costly
commitment a bank can observe is the amount of
own ﬁnancial resourcesthe applicantinvests. This
is measured by the variable own equity.
Higher post-failure earning capacities are
positively related to the variables previous
income, high education and age. Previous
income is proxied by the last year income the
respondent earned and included in our analyses
with one dummy variable, with income higher
than HFL 25,000 as reference category.
8 The
survey measures income in ﬁve categories (less
than 25,000; 25,000–50,000; 50,000–75,000;
75,000–100,000; more than 100,000). We
employed only one dummy variable in our
analysis, as preliminary analyses showed that
application and denial rates only vary between
the lowest income category and all other income
categories. High education is measured with a
dummy variable, which takes the value one if
the respondent has completed higher vocational
training or university and age is measured in
years.
Several variables concerning the previous
occupational experience as well as the demo-
graphics of the potential business starter are
used as indicators for signals regarding the suc-
cess chances of businesses. The variables job
similarity, previous self-employment and lead-
ership reﬂect the respondents occupational
experience. The latter two variables are dummy
variables that take the value one if the respon-
dent has previously been self-employed and has
gained leadership experience in former jobs,
respectively. They equal zero otherwise. The
variable job similarity measures to what extent
the tasks as a self-employed are similar to the
ones performed in the previous job based on the
respondents assessment. The demographics of
the respondents are described by parental self-
employment, married, children and foreign. All
variables are dummy variables, which take the
value one if the respondents parents have ever
been self-employed, the respondent is married,
the respondent has children and the respondent
is born abroad, respectively. They are equal to
zero otherwise. Further, we use single owner-
ship, as an indicator for another signal about the
promising qualities of the new venture.
Finally we use two variables to measure the
number of self-employed contacts. First, self-
employed contacts counts the number of an
applicants contacts who are self-employed. We
also consider the variable self-employed family,
friends and acquaintances. This variable counts
the number of self-employed contacts who are
TABLE III
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for also considering the latter variable is that it
excludes contacts who are business relations and
who may in principle be observable to the bank
if they are mentioned in the business plan and
hence may aﬀect the decision to grant the loan
or not. See Table IV for relevant descriptives of
the used variables.
5. Empirical analysis of application and denial
chances
In this section, we study which individuals are
more likely to experience credit rationing by
estimating the model we presented in section
two. We now turn to the question: ‘‘Who ap-
plies?’’ and present results in the upper part of
Table V. It reveals that the two indicators re-
lated to commitments, namely home ownership
and own equity, increase the chance of credit
application. The results concerning signals
regarding the chance to recollect the debt are
mixed. A low previous income is as expected
negatively related to credit application. A high
education even reduces the chance that a busi-
ness founder applies for a credit. Age has no
signiﬁcant eﬀect. Most of the signals concerning
the business success chances have no signiﬁcant
eﬀect. Only job similarity increases the likeli-
hood that an individual applies for a loan, while
single ownership decreases the probability of
applying for a loan. We also ﬁnd that the
number of self-employed contacts increases the
probability of application. It is worth mention-
ing that our results do not depend on whether
we use the variable self-employed contacts or
self-employed family, friends & acquaintances.
The lower part of Table V indicates under
which circumstances a bank is more likely to
deny an application. We ﬁnd that denial is less
likely to occur if the applicant owns a house.
Likewise own equity lowers credit rationing in
general. With respect to commitments, we note
that if the applicant shows faith in the business
idea by committing own resources, banks are
more likely to approve a credit application. In
this study we investigated writing a business
plan and consulting an accountant and ﬁnd that
TABLE IV
Descriptive statistics for individuals
Full sample Apply = 1 Fully_denied = 1 Partly_denied = 1
Apply = 1 0.30 – – –
Denied1 = 1 – 0.18 – –
Denied2 = 1 – 0.29 – –
Home ownership 0.69 0.75 0.55 0.58
Business plan 0.43 0.63 0.58 0.52
Accountant 0.10 0.27 0.11 0.16
Own equity 30,076 41,278 23,988 27,185
Income<HFL 25,000 0.18 0.12 0.21 0.17
High education 0.38 0.34 0.31 0.33
Age 38 37 37 37
Job similarity 0.44 0.50 0.40 0.41
Previously self-employed 0.20 0.21 0.31 0.24
Leadership 0.54 0.58 0.53 0.57
Parental self-employment 0.35 0.40 0.39 0.39
Married 0.78 0.79 0.78 0.72
Children 0.66 0.66 0.77 0.70
Foreign 0.06 0.06 0.13 0.14
Single ownership 0.75 0.68 0.76 0.79
Self employed-contacts 2.28 2.62 2.81 2.59
Self employed family, friends
and acquaintances
0.18 0.22 0.20 0.19
Number of observations 1140 342 62 98
The numbers in the table represent the means of the corresponding variables.
195 Business Starters and Credit Rationingboth commitments reduce the incidence of loan
denial if we employ partly_denied as a depen-
dent variable. Apparently, applicants may show
their credibility to banks employing these com-
mitments. As a consequence such applications
are subject to less uncertainty and the bank is
more likely to grant the application. Thus,
credible commitments with respect to the recol-
lection chances of a debt and the success chances
of a new business increase the chance that a
bank grants a credit.
Previous income, high education and age sig-
nal the chance to recollect the debt – even if the
businessfails–fromtherespondentslaterincome
streams. We ﬁnd some mixed evidence regarding
the variable measuring previous income. When
TABLE V
Determinants of application rates





















Age 0.023 (0.034) 0.025 (0.034) 0.024 (0.035) 0.026 (0.034)






Previously self-employed 0.112 (0.106) 0.120 (0.105) 0.117 (0.106) 0.121 (0.105)
Leadership 0.071 (0.087) 0.097 (0.086) 0.074 (0.087) 0.097 (0.086)
Parental self-employment 0.140 (0.084) 0.120 (0.084) 0.121 (0.084) 0.125
* (0.084)
Married )0.047 (0.117) )0.023 (0.115) )0.048 (0.117) )0.025 (0.115)
Children 0.098 (0.105) 0.104 (0.104) 0.102 (0.106) 0.105 (0.105)







** (0.024) – – 0.084




** (0.151) – – 0.368
** (0.149)
Constant )0.856 (0.654) )0.794 (0.639) )0.894 (0.654) )1.222 (1.424)
















* (0.632) )1.120 (0.864)
Income<25,000 0.318
** (0.147) 0.353
** (0.174) 0.294 (0.182) 0.237 (0.250)
High education 0.147 (0.110) 0.108 (0.146) 0.149 (0.134) 0.112 (0.183)
Age )0.014 (0.044) )0.005 (0.054) )0.049 (0.053) )0.048 (0.063)






Previously self-employed 0.089 (0.145) 0.164 (0.244) 0.008 (0.160) )0.033 (0.202)
Leadership )0.115 (0.108) )0.099 (0.134) 0.071 (0.148) 0.139 (0.207)
Parental self-employment )0.082 (0.109) )0.052 (0.149) )0.071 (0.135) )0.041 (0.180)
Married 0.137 (0.150) 0.115 (0.186) )0.062 (0.186) )0.160 (0.225)
Children 0.115 (0.164) 0.244 (0.275) 0.214 (0.209) 0.335 (0.280)






Constant 0.742 (0.844) 0.421 (1.215) 1.517 (1.011) 1.222 (1.425)
Rho )0.959
** (0.591) )0.839 (0.861) )0.793 (0.580) )0.493 (0.977)
Log likelihood )794.22 )813.59 )832.03 )850.09







Reported estimates are based on the bivariate model, standard errors in parentheses.
** and
* indicate signiﬁcance at the 5 and
10% level, respectively.
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Income<25,000 is signiﬁcant. However, if we
employ partly_denied it is not. The coeﬃcient of
high education is not signiﬁcant in the denial
estimations, but signiﬁcant and negative in the
application estimations. These results suggest
that education is more a demand than a supply
factor. Highly educated business starters may
havealowerneedforcreditresultinginanegative
eﬀect on credit application. Thus, banks face a
pool of applicants that is lower educated com-
pared to all business starters (see also Table IV).
This right truncation of education in the sample
of applicants reduces the banks decision discre-
tion with respect to education probably resulting
in a non-signiﬁcant eﬀect in the denial decision.
The coeﬃcient of the variable age is not signiﬁ-
cant indicating that banks do not account for
diﬀerences in lifetime horizons when deciding on
a credit application.
All other variables in the lower part of
Table V refer to signals concerning the success
chance of a new business venture. Signals related
to the success chances of the business do not
aﬀect the banks decision except for the variable
job similarity. This suggests that banks tend to
appreciate if applicants have performed tasks in
their previous job, which are similar to the tasks
performed once being self-employed. The coef-
ﬁcient of previously self-employed is not signif-
icantly diﬀerent from zero. Also, the variables
leadership, and parental self-employment, which
are directly related to speciﬁc human capital in
the form of entrepreneurial skills, do not have
an eﬀect. Applicants who were married, who
have children or were born abroad (foreign) are
not less likely to be denied a loan. It appears
that applicants who intend to remain the single
owner of the establishment are more likely to
face credit rationing. Banks are slightly more
likely to refute their request for funds since they
are less likely to fully recollect the debt from a
single owner in case of bankruptcy. Further,
multiple-ownership may signal a higher degree
of credibility of the application. Apparently our
results indicate that banks do not care much
about the increased complexity of the agency
problem in case of multiple-ownership.
By and large, our analysis shows that indi-
cators related to commitments have the expected
eﬀects while the indicators describing diﬀerent
signals show mixed and ambiguous results. It is
striking that most of the variables that are
signiﬁcant in the equation explaining loan
application, except for high education, are also
signiﬁcant in the denial equation. Apparently
the applicants are capable of basing their
application decision on parts of the denial pro-
cedure by the bank. This provides some evidence
in favor of the hypothesis that business starters
understand the credit rationing policy of the
bank. In line with this we like to observe that the
correlation coeﬃcient RHO is always negative
according to our estimates. This makes sense.
Suppose that an applicant has a relatively low
random error in the denial equation. This means
that the applicant is less likely to be denied
credit. Knowing this he or she will be more
likely to apply which is captured by a relatively
high random error term in the application
equation.
We have also estimated our model under the
constraint that RHO is equal to zero, since in
most cases the coeﬃcient is not signiﬁcantly
diﬀerent from zero in our models. The main
conclusions are:
9 First, the estimates of the loan
application model only change marginally and
hence do notalter our previous results. Secondly,
in the constrained model where RHO = 0 the
advice of an accountant becomes a more
important factor reducing the chance of loan
denial, whereas the presence of own equity
becomes an insigniﬁcant variable. Being previ-
ously self-employed, having children and being
bornabroad(foreign)increase the chance ofloan
denial. The other conclusions regarding the
unconstrained model remain largely valid in the
constrained version of the model. We conclude
this section by observing that we have also esti-
mated a univariate probit model for the denial
decision. However, the estimates yielded unex-
pected and implausible signs and are therefore
disregarded. We take this observation as evi-
dence in favor of the validity of the bi-variate
model we employed.
6. Conclusion
The ﬁrst question we address in this paper is:
‘‘Who experiences credit rationing when starting
197 Business Starters and Credit Rationinga business?’’ We have estimated a model that
determines which features aﬀect whether an
application is denied or not by a ﬁnancial
institution and that simultaneously takes into
account which individuals apply for a loan. It is
important to integrate both decisions since some
individuals may not apply for a loan since they
expect to be unsuccessful. If applying for a loan
is rather costly they will abstain from under-
taking this eﬀort. Such persons should be
regarded rationed as well.
We argued that a banks decision to approve
or deny a credit application depends on com-
mitments and signals provided by the potential
entrepreneur showing the bank that the new
ventures success is likely and repayment of the
debt is highly probable. Our results indicate that
personal wealth plays an important role. In line
with Black et al. (1996) we ﬁnd that home
ownership is important to acquire access to
external ﬁnancial resources. Individuals that use
own capital to fund their business are more
likely to receive credit. Earning capacity, how-
ever, reduces full credit denial, but not partial
denial. Apparently, banks take earning capaci-
ties into account, but reduce the risk of uncer-
tain future income streams by rationing credit.
These results reinforce our conclusion that
banks value commitments more than signals.
We ﬁnd some evidence that the writing of a
business plan and the support of an accountant
enhance the credibility of a loan application.
Small ﬁnancial commitments, i.e. the incurred
costs for writing a business plan and hiring an
accountant seem to convince banks. The eﬀects
of a business plan and advice from an accoun-
tant point also at the fact, that banks are more
likely to grant credit, if the provided informa-
tion on the business is more trustworthy and
reliable and less subject to an optimistic bias of
the business founder.
Higher education signiﬁcantly reduces the
incentive to apply for credit, though it does not
aﬀect a banks decision to deny or request for a
loan or not. This result suggests that education
is more a demand than a supply factor. Highly
educated individuals may have no need to apply
for credit. The results for other potential de-
mand variables (own equity and previous in-
come) show that business starters decisions to
apply for credit are driven by their assessment of
supply factors, since higher levels of own equity
and previous income increase the chance of loan
application. Nevertheless, these results point at
an issue worth investigating in the future,
namely the interplay between demand and sup-
ply factors in the decision to apply.
Empirical studies on the survival of new
businesses show that work experience, previous
self-employment and leadership experience are
positively related to success (see, e.g., Bru ¨ derl et
al., 1992; Gimeno et al., 1997; van Praag, 1996).
Our analysis suggests that banks appreciate if a
potential business founder has gained relevant
similar experience in a paid job, but are reluc-
tant to value previous self-employment and
leadership experience. Age does not aﬀect credit
rationing according to our results. Parental self-
employment, being married, the presence of
children and being born abroad do not aﬀect the
probability of denial. The insigniﬁcant coeﬃ-
cient for foreigners seems to contradict other
studies reporting that blacks are more credit
constrained (see, e.g., Blanchﬂower et al., 1998;
Cavaluzzo and Cavaluzzo, 1998; Raturi and
Swamy, 1999; Storey, 2004). It should be noted,
that according to those studies other ethnicities,
such as Asians and Hispanic, are not con-
strained. In the Netherlands, most immigrants
stem from countries neighboring the Mediter-
ranean Sea and former Dutch colonies. More-
over, despite large diﬀerences between
immigrant and incumbent citizens, the trench
between those groups might be less severe than
in other countries.
The indicators describing signals regarding
the success chances and the chance to recollect
the debt even if the business fails are mostly not
signiﬁcant with the exception of previous
income and job similarity. This suggests that
banks are rather reluctant in employing non-
ﬁnancial criteria in their credit decisions,
although many studies provide support that for
example parental self-employment enhances
business success strongly. The ﬁndings regarding
those signals are, however, in line with ﬁndings
of previous studies on the eﬀects of character-
istics of the business owner and the ﬁrm (see
section 3). Individuals who intend to remain
the sole owner of the establishment are more
198 Boris F. Blumberg and Wilko A. Letterielikely to experience diﬃculties in receiving a
loan. Our results also indicate the importance of
self-employed contacts. Personal networks with
other self-employed seem to raise an individ-
uals ability to making a well-reasoned decision
regarding the request for external ﬁnancing.
The second issue we address in this paper is
whether the business starters have some
understanding regarding the rating policy of the
bank. We ﬁnd that the decision to apply or not
is based on largely the same characteristics that
determine the denial decision. Apparently,
business starters foresee the decision procedure
of the bank to a large extent and apply only if
they expect that the application yields a rea-
sonable success chance. Hence, credit rationing
does not only aﬀect individuals who submit a
loan application at a bank. It also discourages
individuals to apply for a loan if they know in
advance that their request for a loan will be
denied with high probability. For instance, if
they dont own substantial ﬁnancial resources
or do not possess a home they will ﬁnd it very
hard to receive a loan even though their busi-
ness idea is excellent. Hence, credit rationing
also aﬀects the decision to apply for a bank
loan or not.
One limitation of our study arises from the
used sample, which focuses on newly founded
ﬁrms, which does not allow us to use measures
associated with the ﬁrms previous performance
or borrowing behavior, as for example Caval-
uzzo and Cavaluzzo (1998) do. Our indicators
describing the business founders, their ability to
repay the loan and their success chances, such as
previous income and leadership experience,
substitute, however, at least partly for the
omission of any historic track record of the ﬁrm.
Other similar studies, we mentioned in this pa-
per, also include other characteristics of the ﬁrm
as indicators for the risk associated with the
speciﬁc venture. Our analysis does not include
such variables, as at the time the entrepreneurs
applied for credit, their business was not started
yet. Hence, information on ﬁrm demographics
or ﬁnancial indicators were not available, al-
though the business founder as well as the bank
will have had some idea how the intended
business will look like in terms of the legal form
or the intended number of employees (size).
Notes
1 Harris and Raviv (1991) and Hubbard (1998) provide
excellent reviews of the literature on capital constraints.
2 See Parker (2004) for a survey of the literature on
ﬁnancing entrepreneurial ventures.
3 See also Greene (1998) and Montmarquette
et al. (2001) and the references cited therein for further
details on the bivariate probit model with sample selection.
4 See Lopez-Gracia and Aybar-Arias (2000), Verheul and
Thurik (2001) and the references cited therein.
5 In signaling games, in equilibrium costly messages may
reveal the type of the sender. See for instance Myers and
Majluf (1984) and Gibbons (1992).
6 We thank one of the reviewers for pointing us at this
issue.
7 Though not reported in the table our data are likely to
under-represent ICT businesses. We cannot make a strong
conclusion here since the data provided by Dutch Statistics
do not provide suﬃcient detail.
8 HFL (Hollandse Florijn) was the Dutch national cur-
rency (Dutch Guilder) at the time of the survey. HFL 1
equals approximately e0.45.
9 Results are not reported here, but are available from the
authors upon request.
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